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Abstract
In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic diﬀerential game with an
inﬁnite planning horizon. The performance function is assumed to be indeﬁnite and the underlying
system aﬃne. We derive both necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which this game has a Nash
equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, there is an increased interest in studying diverse problems in economics and
optimal control theory using dynamic games. In particular in environmental economics and macroe-
conomic policy coordination, dynamic games are a natural framework to model policy coordination
problems (see e.g. the books and references in Dockner et al. [5], Jørgensen et al. [13], Plasmans et
al. [19] and Grass et al. [10]). Moreover, in optimal control theory it is well-known that, e.g., the
issue to obtain robust control strategies can be approached as a dynamic game problem (see e.g. [1],
[15] and [3]).
In this note we consider the linear quadratic diﬀerential game under a feedback information
structure. The reason to consider this information structure is that the corresponding linear feedback
Nash equilibria (FBNE) have the nice property of strong time consistency. A property which, e.g.,
does not hold under an open-loop information structure.
∗Corresponding Author
1This problem has been considered by many authors and dates back to the seminal work of Starr and
Ho in [20].
For the ﬁxed ﬁnite planning horizon, one can show that there exists at most one FBNE (see
e.g. [16], [17]). The question whether a solution exists depends on the solvability of a related set
of coupled Riccati diﬀerential equations. Global existence and convergence properties of solutions
of these diﬀerential equations has, e.g., been studied in [18], [9] and [21]. Further, the problem of
calculating the solutions of these diﬀerential equations was considered in, e.g., [4] and [12]. In [2] the
more general aﬃne-quadratic diﬀerential game was considered, and conditions were derived under
which the game admits a FBN solution, aﬃne in the current state of the system. In both [2] and
[6] one can ﬁnd additional references and generalizations of the above results. In particular one can
ﬁnd here results for an inﬁnite planning horizon and indefnite cost functions (that is the case that
the state weighting matrices Qi (see below) are indeﬁnite). Some more recent generalizations are [7],
where the game problem is solved assuming that the players use static output feedback control, and
[8], where the problem is considered for descriptor systems.
All of the above results are, for an inﬁnite planning horizon, formulated for a performance cri-
terion that is a pure quadratic form of the state and control variables. In this note we generalize
this result for performance criteria that also include ”cross-terms”, i.e. products of the state and
control variables. Performance criteria of this type often naturally appear in economic policy making.
Moreover, we assume that the linear system describing the dynamics is aﬀected by a deterministic
variable.
The outline of this note is as follows. Section two introduces the problem and contains some
preliminary results. The main results of this paper are stated in Section three, whereas Section four
contains some concluding remarks. The proof of the main theorem is included in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we assume that player i ∈ ¯ N (see the end of this paper for the introduced notation)
likes to minimize w.r.t. ui: limtf→∞ Ji(tf,x0,u1,    ,uN)
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, Mi = MT
i , Rii > 0, i ∈ ¯ N,
and x(t) satisﬁes the linear diﬀerential equation
˙ x(t) = Ax(t) +
N  
i=1
Biui(t) + c(t), x(0) = x0. (2)
The variable c ∈ L2(0,∞) here is some given trajectory. Notice that we make no deﬁniteness
assumptions w.r.t. matrix Qi.
2We assume that the matrix pairs (A,Bi), i ∈ ¯ N, are stabilizable. So, in principle, each player is
capable to stabilize the system on his own.
The linear feedback information structure of the game means that both players know the current
state of the system and that the set of admissible control actions are aﬃne functions of the current
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Notice that the assumption that the players use simultaneously stabilizing controls introduces the
cooperative meta-objective of both players to stabilize the system (see e.g. [6] for a discussion).
Then, u∗ := (u∗
1,    ,u∗
N) ∈ Us is called a feedback Nash equilibrium if the usual inequalities apply,
i.e., no player can improve his performance by a unilateral deviation from this set of equilibrium
actions. Introducing the notation u∗
−i(α) := u∗ where u∗
i has been replaced by the arbitrary input
function α the formal deﬁnition reads as follows
Deﬁnition 2.1 ((F ∗
1,g∗
1),    ,(F ∗
N,g∗
N)) or u∗ ∈ Us is called a feedback Nash equilibrium if for i ∈ ¯ N,
Ji(x0,u∗) ≤ Ji(x0,u∗
−i(α)) for every x0 and input α such that u∗
−i(α) ∈ Us. ￿
3 Main results
In the Appendix the following theorem is proved.
Theorem 3.1 The aﬃne diﬀerential game (1,2) has a feedback Nash equilibrium ((F1,g1),    ,(FN,gN))
for every initial state if and only if
F = −G






Here Ki, i ∈ ¯ N, are symmetric solutions of the coupled algebraic Riccati equations
A
T







= 0, i ∈ ¯ N, (5)
that have the property that σ(Acl) ⊂ l C−, where Acl := A+BF. Further, m(t) is the unique solution





















1σ(H) denotes the spectrum of matrix H; l C− = {λ ∈ l C | Re(λ) < 0}; l C
+
0 = {λ ∈ l C | Re(λ) ≥ 0}.
3Remark 3.2
Introducing H := diag(−AT
cl)+col
  




G−1 ˜ BT we obtain by diﬀerentiation
of (6) that m(t) solves the next diﬀerential equation
˙ m(t) = Hm(t) − Kc(t). (7)
￿







Proof. Clearly, due to our assumption on σ(H), m(t) in (8) is well-deﬁned. By straightforward

































































So, m(t) satisﬁes (6). Since (6) has a unique solution this concludes the proof. ￿
Corollary 3.4 In case c(.) = 0 it is clear that mi = 0 and it follows that Ji = xT
0 Kix0. ￿
Notice that in case the set of algebraic Riccati equations (5) has more than one set of stabilizing
solutions, there exists more than one FBNE equilibrium. This may happen even if all Qi matrices
are positive deﬁnite (see e.g. [6][Theorem 8.10]).
Remark 3.5 Consider the two-player zero-sum game, i.e. J1 = −J2, where for simplicity of notation










. By addition of the two equations we get from (5) (followed
by some elementary rewriting) that Ki satisfy the equation
A
T
cl(K1 + K2) + (K1 + K2)Acl = 0.
Since Acl is a stable matrix it follows from this linear matrix equation that necessarily K1 +K2 = 0.
So we have that K2 = −K1. Substitution of this into (5) shows that these equations have a stabilizing
solution if and only if the equation
A
TK1 + K1A + Q1 − [V1 + K1B1 W1 + K1B2]G
−1[V1 + K1B1 − (W1 + K1B2)]
T = 0 (9)















. Since R11 is invertible one can use, e.g., the expression for the inverse of a block























































is clearly symmetric too.
So (9) is an ordinary Riccati equation, from which we know that it has at most one stabilizing
solution. Therefore, we conclude that the zero-sum game has a solution if and only if (9) has a
stabilizing solution. Furthermore, in case the game has a solution the equilibrium actions are unique
and given by
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1
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cl(t−s)K1c(s)ds and m2(t) = −m1(t).
This, since (see (3)) both (K1B2+W1−F T
2 R22+F T
1 N1) = 0 and (K1B1+V1+F T
1 R11+F T
2 NT
1 ) = 0.
￿
4 Concluding Remarks
In this note we considered the aﬃne regular indeﬁnite inﬁnite-planning horizon linear-quadratic dif-
ferential game. Both necessary conditions and suﬃcient conditions were derived for the existence of
an aﬃne feedback Nash equilibrium. Since Qi are assumed to be indeﬁnite, the obtained results were
directly used to solve the zero-sum game. We showed that this game has at most one equilibrium.
Further, (assuming that the system is not corrupted by noise) the equilibrium actions coincide with
those one obtains for the open-loop information case if the uncontrolled system is stable. However,
since the open-loop result requires some additional conditions to be satisﬁed, we conclude that the
realization of a zero-sum Nash equilibrium under an open-loop information setting will less often
occur than under a feedback information setting.
5Notation
The next shorthand notation will be used.
k := n +
 N




1 ,    ,DT
N
 T; diag(Di) is the diagonal matrix where the ith diagonal entry equals Di.
If D = [D1,     , DN], D−i is obtained from D by replacing the ith entry by a zero entry which has
the same size as Di, i.e. D−i := [D1,    ,Di−1, 0 ,Di+1,    ,DN].
IN,−i is obtained from the identity matrix by replacing the ithmi × mi identity block matrix by the
zero matrix of the same size, i.e. IN,i := diag(Im1,    ,Imi−1,0mi,Imi+1,    ,IN).
Mi,/1 is obtained from Mi by dropping its ﬁrst n columns, i.e. Mi,/1 = Mi[0(n−k)×n In−k]T.
IN,−i is obtained from the identity matrix by replacing the ithmi × mi identity block matrix by the
zero matrix of the same size, i.e. IN,i := diag(Im1,    ,Imi−1,0mi,Imi+1,    ,IN).
IN+1,−mi is obtained from the k×k identity matrix by replacing the (1+i)thmi×mi identity block ma-
trix by the zero matrix of the same size, i.e. IN+1,−mi := diag(In,Im1,    ,Imi−1,0mi,Imi+1,    ,IN).
Ei is obtained from the column matrix containing N + 1 zero blocks, where block i is replaced by
the identity matrix, i.e. ET
i = [0   0 I 0   0].
B := [B1,    ,BN];   BT := diag(BT
1 ,BT
2 ,    ,BT
N).
F := [F T
1 ,    ,F T
N]T; g := [gT
1 ,    ,gT
N]T; m := [mT
1,    ,mT
N]T; K := [KT
















[0 Im1 0      0]M1
[0 0 Im2 0     0]M2
...
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323 V T
333 R33 V344     V34N
. . . ... ... ... . . .
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We assume throughout that this matrix G is invertible.







[0 I 0 0     0]M1
[0 0 I 0     0]M2
. . .















































6subject to the state dynamics
˙ x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + c(t,x0), x(0) = x0, (11)
and u ∈ Us(x0). Then,
1. with c(.) = p(.) = 0, (10,11) has a solution for all x0 ∈ I Rn if and only if the algebraic Riccati
equation
A
TK + KA − KSK + Q = 0
has a symmetric stabilizing solution K(.) (i.e. A − SK is a stable matrix).
2. for every x0, (10,11) with c(.,x0), p(.) ∈ L2, has a solution iﬀ. item 1 has a solution. Moreover














∗(t) = (A − SK)x
∗(t) − Sm(t) + c(t), x
∗(0) = x0.
Proof. Similar to the proof of [6, Theorem 5.16]. ￿
Proof of Theorem 3.1.





for every x0 and input α such that u∗
−1(α) ∈ Us From this inequality we see that for every x0 ∈ I Rn
































subject to the (nonhomogeneous) state equation
˙ x(t) = (A + B−1F
∗
−1)x(t) + B1u1(t) + B−1g
∗
−1(t) + c(t), x(0) = x0,




2 M1) = 0. Therefore, with


















































7subject to the (nonhomogeneous) state equation

























+ c(t), x(0) = x0,




































has a stabilizing solution.
According Theorem 4.1 the minimization problem (13,14) has a unique solution. Introducing for










− S1K1, its solution is










1 (t−s){K1n1(s) + p1(s)}ds, (17)
where pT

















+c(s) and K1 the
stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation (20). Consequently, see (12),









































solves the original optimization problem. Since the optimal control for this problem is uniquely
determined, and by deﬁnition the equilibrium control u∗
1 = F ∗
1x(t) + g∗
1(t) solves the optimization





































































− SiKi, mi(t) =
  ∞
t e− ¯ AT
i (t−s)(Kini(s) + pi(s))ds,
pT

















+ c(s) and Ki the
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Again, since the minimizing control is uniquely determined, we conclude from (19) and the fact that
by deﬁnition u∗
i(t) = F ∗
i x(t) + g∗































































































 = − ˜ B
Tm(t).













). Substitution of this
into (20) gives (5).

















































































































−i = IN,−ig∗ = −IN,−iG−1 ˜ BTm(t), the integral equation for m as advertized in (6) results.
As σ(Acl) ⊂ l C− and c(.) ∈ L2 it follows from, e.g., [11][Theorem 2.1.1] that (6) has a unique solution.
”⇐ part” Let K be a stabilizing solution of (5) and deﬁne for i  = 1, u∗
i := (F ∗
i ,g∗
i) by (3,4,6).
Next, without loss of generality, consider the minimization by player one of the cost functional
J1(x0,u1,u
∗






























subject to the system ˙ x(t) = (A + B−1F ∗
−1)x(t) + B1u1(t) + B−1g∗
−1 + c(t), x(0) = x0.
From the ”⇒” part of the proof we have that the problem can be rewritten as the minimization of
(13) subject to (14). From (3) it follows (see e.g. (20) again) that (5) can be rewritten as (20). In




































has a stabilizing solution K = K1. But this implies, according Theorem 4.1, that the minimization
of (13) subject to (14) has a solution. From the ”⇒” part of the proof we recall that its solution is

















































Or stated diﬀerently, (F ∗
1,g∗
1) is the optimal response of player one in case all other players i use the
control strategy (F ∗
i ,g∗
i). This proves that this set of control actions constitute a Nash equilibrium
for the game. ￿
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